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Dear Rector, ladies and gentlemen 
Over the years I have been asked many times about my fascination with inspection, accountability, 
assessment and evaluation. For many, these topics sound like dry, unexciting areas of work, more 
appropriate to a man in a grey, ill-fitting suit, obsessed with numbers and ledgers.  
 
Introduction: Bronfenbrenner’s model to understand change 
When trying to explain my interest I would often return to my PhD research on school inspections 
here in the Netherlands, and particularly my case study work. In these case studies I shadowed 
inspectors of primary schools on their visits of schools to understand how they assessed schools 
and if and how their feedback led to improvement. I was testing the assumption that schools vary 
in their capacity and willingness to improve through inspections, and that school inspectors needed 
to vary their style of inspection to motivate change. The underlying theory to this hypothesis is 
grounded in responsive regulation which posits that regulators need to start with less coercive, less 
interventionist, and cheaper strategies to ensure compliant behaviour, and only move up the 
pyramid when these fail (see figure 1). 
 





Signalling to stakeholders the capacity to escalate to ‘the tough stuff’ higher up the pyramid is 
thought to motivate more cooperative problem solving at the base of the pyramid. Applied to 
school inspections in my PhD I assumed that schools with the capacity and willingness to improve 
would do so when visited by an inspector with a ‘restrained’ inspection style, while schools with 
no capacity or willingness to improve would require a more directive style of inspection. The 
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assumption was rejected as I didn’t find any differences in effects between the two types of 
inspectors and schools, but the visits did lead to various insights which still inspire my work today. 
 
One of the observations and sources of inspiration during those visits was the vast differences in 
how teachers and head teachers would communicate with inspectors and how these inspectors 
would interact with schools. One case I remember vividly was of a Christian orthodox school on 
the ‘bible belt’, a strip of land in the Netherlands with the highest concentration of conservative 
orthodox Calvinist Protestants in the country.  
 
The inspector, a middle aged white man, dressed in a three piece suit and me in a long black skirt 
visited the school over two  beautiful autumn days. The school day started with church hymns 
played by a teacher on the school’s organ. This sober music greeted us that morning as did the 
school with its quiet and safe atmosphere where discipline and time on task contributed to an 
effective learning environment and high learning standards. During the visit, the inspector had 
frequent conversations with the head teacher about aspects of teaching that could be improved and 
specific teachers who needed further professional development and support. Although these 
conversations were all informal and pleasant, there was an undertone of great unease on both sides 
that I could only explain towards the end of the visit. After our final feedback meeting with the 
school staff, the inspector confided in me to say that he had rather not inspected this school given 
that he was gay; he had clearly struggled with the frequent references of school staff to marriage 
between a man and a woman being a divine institution.  
When I returned to the school for further interviews I asked the head teacher about the visit and 
whether the school had used the feedback from the inspector in any way. They explained how they 
had respectfully discussed the feedback but had come to the conclusion that the inspector had not 
really understood their values and school mission. Apart from a small number of minor changes, 
most of the feedback on such important aspects of pedagogy as differentiating teaching for pupils 
with varying levels of capability and achievement was ignored. In the school’s view, the inspector 
did not have the legitimacy to advise them on their instructional practices, and the accountability 
framework did not provide the incentives or stakes needed to enforce change. 
 
What this story highlights is not just why the research on inspection and accountability is so 
fascinating, but also that it is not about numbers and facts but about relations and interactions 
between people and how they collaborate, or fail to collaborate to improve teaching and learning. 
When we try to understand how schools function or how to improve education systems, we need 
to think about how policies and interventions affect teachers and head teachers in schools, their 
pupils, parents and other professionals working with schools, and particularly how they are held 
to account and engage with external accountability. This has been at the forefront of my research 
the last two decades and I’d like to share some of the highlights with you here. I will use 
Bronfenbrenner’s model of human development, depicted here, to guide us through as his 
ecological perspective on development and change offers a structured framework to understand 




Figure 2. Bronfenbrenner’s (1989) ecological systems theory of human development 
 
 
Bronfenbrenner’s model applied to education systems 
Bronfenbrenner pictures the learning of an individual at the heart of his model (figure 1), resulting 
from an interaction of processes, person, and context. The model shows that developmental 
processes and outcomes vary as a joint function of the characteristics of the person as well as the 
environment, and how these also change over the course of time (Bronfenbrenner, 1989, p. 200). 
The model has been adapted by various colleagues to understand education system change, such 
as by Snyder (2013), Johnson (2008) and Godfrey and Brown (2018) who have taken the 
development and learning of the school organisation as a starting point. They describe how 
organisational developmental processes (e.g., teaching and learning) and outcomes (e.g. student 
achievement) vary as a joint function of the characteristics of the school and of the ecological 
systems or environment surrounding the school. Let me explain each of the circles in the model 
and how the model provides a lens through which we can understand the functioning of education 
systems.  
 
The first circle is the microsystem which constitutes the interactions at the interpersonal level, such 
as the actions and interactions of school leaders, teachers, staff, parents, governors and students. 
The microsystem is the system closest to the developing person and the one in which they have 
direct contact. A microsystem of a child typically includes family, peers, or caregivers, and, in a 
school setting his/her teacher(s), other adults working in the school and his/her peers. Extending 
the theory to the development and learning of adults in a school setting situates teachers, head 
teachers and even policy-makers in the microsystem and how they interact with and learn from 
others (colleagues, peers, employees, employers, stakeholders).  
 
Bronfenbrenner emphasizes the bi-directionality of these relationships and how someone’s 
reactions to the people in his/her microsystem will affect how they treat you in return. This is the 
most influential level of the ecological systems theory, according to Härkönen (2005). When we 
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try to understand school and system reform, we need to look at how such reforms have an effect 
on the interactions of students and their teachers, but also how teachers learn about the reform, 
make sense of whether and how to improve their teaching by trying out new approaches in their 
classroom. How students respond will in turn shape teachers’ learning and development and 
implementation of reform as students’ responses confirm or reject their initial beliefs about the 
value of the reform for their specific group of students. As a teacher I’m more inclined to continue 
using a new instructional approach if my students understand certain subject matter better than 
before.  
 
The next layer is the mesosystem which consists of the interactions between the different parts of 
a person's microsystem, such as the relationship between the students’ parents and his/her teacher. 
When parents take an active role in their child’s school career, such as by attending parent/teacher 
conferences, volunteering in his/her classroom and supporting their child with homework, this can 
have a positive influence on the child’s development.  
The positive effect of a positively interconnected mesosystem also applies to the learning of, for 
example, teachers and principals in a school where bidirectional interactions between groups of 
teachers and students or school staff and parents shape the organisational culture of the school, 
and opportunities to discuss the quality of the work, and thereby influence the learning of those 
involved and the improvement of the school.  
 
The third circle, or exosystem in Bronfenbrenner’s model is the external environment of which 
individuals are part and which exerts influence upon them, such as government policies, networks 
or other organisations that connect to the school. Decisions made in the exosystem will have 
bearing on the person, even though he or she has no participation in the decision-making process. 
An example would be a child being affected by a parent receiving a promotion at work or losing 
their job. If we take teachers and head teachers as the unit of analysis, examples are government 
policies on education, restraints on public spending, parental demands for choice, or local 
economic conditions that affect their work and shape their opportunities to learn and develop 
(Johnson, 2008). Commonplace in many nations’ education policies has been the promotion of 
school-led improvement, coupled with the encouragement of new types of networks of schools, 
according to Greany and Higham (2018). Such policies emphasise horizontal connections in the 
ecosystem, specifically at the meso- and exo-levels, through school-to-school collaboration or 
teachers and school leaders working across schools (Godfrey and Brown, 2018); these connections 
will create new relationships and opportunities for learning. 
 
The macrosystem depicted as the fourth circle can be thought of as the “social blueprint” of a given 
culture, subculture, or broad social context and consists of the overarching pattern of values, belief 
systems, lifestyles, opportunities, customs, and resources embedded therein (Johnson, 2008). This 
system is generally considered to exert a unidirectional influence upon not only the person but also 
his/her micro-, meso-, and exosystem. A child, his or her parent, a teacher, head teacher and his or 
her school are all part of a larger cultural context where members of a cultural group share a 
common identity, heritage, and values, such as on the purpose of education and reform, and the 
underlying cultural blueprint in which the system exists. Students or teachers (the individual we 
expect to learn and develop) will be affected by this context as and when it permeates his/her 
(opportunities for) interactions with others, access to resources etc. In England for example the 
neo-liberal economic and political agenda and appreciation for academic performance targets, 
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school choice and competition has dominated the reform agenda and has affected how students 
and school staff interact.  
 
A final dimension is time as the interactions depicted in the model are not static but will change 
over time. Bronfenbrenner’s work particularly refers to age-related developmental processes of 
individuals, but wider sociohistorical circumstances are also relevant to understand how and why 
reforms are implemented in schools. Teachers’ experience and number of years working in the 
school will likely affect their capacity to for example teach new instructional content. Recently 
qualified teachers often have their hands full with classroom and behavioural management. Also, 
a school’s organisational dimensions will change over time in ways that affect a school staff’s and 
students’ learning and development. Johnson (2008) for example refers to the day-to-day and year-
to-year developmental changes that occur in a school’s student body, teaching staff, curricular 
choices, and the overall number of years a school is in operation. Newer schools face challenges 
and opportunities that differ from those of a school that has been in operation for a length of time 
and this will affect opportunities of staff working in the school to learn and develop. 
Bronfenbrenner refers to time as the ‘chronosystem’ and these patterning of events and transitions 
over the life course influences the operation of all levels of the ecological system (Johnson, 2008).  
 
These brief examples highlight how, even though Bronfenbrenner developed his model to 
understand human development, the ecological perspective provides a relevant lens through which 
to understand education systems as a set of nested structures where the higher and lower levels 
mutually influence and shape each other. Any change, disturbance or action that occurs at any 
level can have an effect on other parts of the ecosystem, including laterally and upwards. 
Recognizing and understanding these mutual relationships is indispensable for a holistic 
comprehension of the essence of education systems and how we can understand improvement of 
schools and learning outcomes.  
 
Understanding school and system improvement, and particularly the role of accountability in such 
improvement has underpinned my work over the years. In my research I’ve chosen a comparative 
and realist approach to find answers about why, how and under what conditions various models of 
accountability are or are not effective. How do people and organisations hold each other 
accountable for the quality and outcomes of their work? Which ‘interventions’ such as internal 
school-evaluation, peer review, inspections or standardized testing are used in these accountability 
relations and if, and how do they improve education? Why are some schools and systems more 
effective than others and which mechanisms explain these differences? Bronfenbrenner’s model 
allows us to structure our thinking and answer some of these questions, acknowledging the fact 
that countries, and even regions and cities within countries, vary in how they coordinate school 
improvement and how accountability is conceptualized and implemented as part of this mix. Let 
me explain and illustrate the model by offering two examples of the countries I know best: England 
and the Netherlands. 
 
Exo and macrosystem 
These two countries are also particularly interesting as they have a similar model of accountability 
with high stakes testing and school inspections, but they vary substantially in how the education 
system (Bronfenbrenner’s exo and macrosystem) is coordinated and governed with a distinct mix 
of market, hierarchy and network. 
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Box 1. Three modes of coordination: 
• Hierarchy: tightly managed from the centre with strong, top-down control of recruitment, 
promotion, curriculum and content of classroom instruction 
• Market: independent relations between ‘buyer’ and ‘seller’, coordination through price and 
competition 
• Networks: collaboration between interdependent actors; joint decision-making based on 
interdependency, trust, and empathy  
 
These three are well-known modes of governance of education systems, described for example by  
Windzio et al (2005) and Greany and Higham (2018), where each has its distinct structure in 
institutions and actor constellations (e.g state and/or non-state), and a unique process or mode of 
social coordination by which actors engage in rulemaking and implementation and in the provision 
of education.  
 
Hierarchies are for example based on authority, clear division of tasks, rules, rationality and 
objectivity were the state is in charge of regulating school quality. It does so by setting standards 
on for example curriculum and assessment and typically enforces these through school inspections.  
In marketized systems, parents typically have free school choice and funding mechanisms aim to 
encourage schools to compete for pupils. Inspection reports and league tables are expected to 
inform parents’ decision-making process.  
Network governance, which emerged in the 1990s has trust and empathy as the organizing 
principles where school-to-school collaboration is seen as a viable strategy for improvement or 
where community-based partnerships between schools and other service providers are expected to 
provide for more inclusive education or to address high inequality in the education system. 
 
In both England and the Netherlands we find a combination of all three approaches to co-ordinating 
the school system, but here I’d like to focus on the dominant logic in both countries and how this 
is informing student learning in the microsystem as conceptualized in Bronfenbrenner’s model. In 
England, the dominant logic is one of the (quasi)market. I add ‘quasi’ here on purpose because no 
education system will be a pure market: there are too many constraints for supply and demand to 
only be matched on the basis of monetary incentives. In England, choice and competition are 
however considered to be important drivers for high educational quality and dominant paradigms 
of reform.  
 
The most recent example of this logic is the introduction of academies in 2000. Academies were 
introduced to improve pupil performance and ‘break the cycle of low expectations’ which was 
believed to be caused by the local authorities in charge of these schools2. Although these schools 
are state-funded, they have freedom over finance, staffing, the curriculum and admissions of 
students, and are independent of local authority control. Private and third-sector providers are 
encouraged to govern these schools and to run a portfolio of schools in a more business-like 
manner. As the UK Department for Education specifies in one of its white papers: they are 
expected ‘to improve standards and increase financial efficiencies and sustainability’ (DfE, 2016b: 
8) and are expected to be better equipped to do so than local authorities. Interestingly, the valuing 
                                                          
2 Carvel, John (15 March 2000). "Blunkett plans network of city academies". The Guardian. Archived from the 
original on 4 May 2014. Retrieved 4 May 2014. 
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of competition and enterprise as a driver for improvement is one that is surprisingly held across 
the political spectrum in England and not just by the conservative party. It was Labour prime 
minister Tony Blair who, in 2005 drastically changed the role of Local Education Authorities in 
running schools, emphasising that3: 
 
‘(…) schools will be accountable not to government at the centre or locally, but to parents, with 
the creativity and enterprise of the teachers and school leaders set free.”
‘“Where parents are dissatisfied, they need a range of good schools to choose from; or where 
there is no such choice, [to be] able to take the remedy into their own hands. Where business, the 
voluntary sector, philanthropy, which in every other field is an increasing part of our national life, 
want to play a key role in education, and schools want them to, they can.’
 
How much of this type of market thinking do we find in the Netherlands? 
 
The Dutch education system is, on the surface, quite similar to the English system. Here, schools 
also have high autonomy, parents have freedom of school choice and school choice is often 
promoted by the government as a way to increase competition in the school system. When Trouw 
published a league table of secondary schools in 1997, the newspaper sold out within hours4. 
However, referring back to Bronfenbrenner’s macrosystem, the values underpinning school 
autonomy and choice in the Netherlands are  also (or perhaps even more so) about the freedom of 
education than competition, although the one does not rule out the other. In the Netherlands the 
freedom of education is a constitutional right guaranteed under Article 23 of the Constitution, 
which ended the state monopoly in education and allows anyone to establish a school, determine 
the principles on which the school is based, and organize classroom teaching. As a study by 
Karsten in 1999 shows, there was never much interest to introduce market-type mechanisms in 
education in the Netherlands in the past, while, in the 1990s up until today there seems much more 
concern about inequality of opportunity in education. The annual report of the Dutch Inspectorate 
in 2016 and 20175 and subsequent headlines in the press about rising inequality suggest that this 
continues to be a concern and the increasing competition between schools is criticized in this 
respect, instead of welcomed as a mechanism for improvement.  
 
In the Netherlands, the dominant logic is not one of the market but one of network governance, as 
a study by Hooge, Waslander and Theisens (2017) visualizes: 
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2 Carvel, John (15 March 2000). "Blunkett plans network of city academies". The Guardian. Archived from the 
original on 4 May 2014. Retrieved 4 May 2014. 
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of competition and enterprise as a driver for improvement is one that is surprisingly held across 
the political spectrum in England and not just by the conservative party. It was Labour prime 
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Figure 3. Steering network dynamics in the Dutch education system (citizenship education in VET) 
 
 
Source: NRC, 20 june 20176  
 
This graphic representation of stakeholders in secondary education shows how the Dutch system 
has a large number of organisations and institutions that operate between the level of school boards 
and that of national government (Hooge, 2013). There are different steering networks for every 
combination of sector and policy issue. In the introduction of civic competences, Hooge and 
colleagues identified for example at least 10-15 actors at the intermediate administrative level 
engaging in policymaking in ways that affect school boards’ autonomy and discretion to govern 
their schools. The Ministry of Education is one of the partners in this network and actively engages 
these organisations7 in their steering of the system. They do so through a set of agreements, such 
as the National Education ‘Convenant’, introduced in 2013, between the Minister of Education 
and various organisations. The agreement sets out an improvement agenda for all education sectors 
by 20208. Rather than competition and choice, negotiation and collaboration are part of the social 
blueprint of the Dutch education system and inspired by our well-known ‘Polder model’: a 
consensus-based model of decision-making which was initiated in 1982, when unions, employers, 
and government decided on a comprehensive plan to revitalise the economy.  
 
One of the underlying values of such national agreements are the value of having a good education, 
not just for individual economic benefits but also for society at large which is believed to prosper 
with a highly educated population. The state is viewed as a trusted partner to ensure everyone’s 
                                                          
6 https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2017/06/20/leraar-overbelast-door-sectorraden-platforms-advies-a1563754 
7 independent administrative bodies with policy responsibilities or administrative tasks in education, regional 
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centres 
8 the cross sectoral representative umbrella organisation for sector-wide educational boards – the Association of 
Education, a joint initiative of the Sector Councils for primary education, secondary education, vocational education, 
higher professional education and universities - and additionally employer and employee organisations 
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access to a high quality education and does so in the Netherlands through a networked approach, 
instead of in the Anglo-Saxon model where the onus is on the individual and quasi-market forces. 
In England, the ‘Nanny state’ is a common reference to criticize national government for 
interfering in people’s lives.  
 
To understand such a lack of enthusiasm for state interference in education in England, I turn to 
one of my distinguished English colleagues, Ron Glatter who explains England’s emphasis on 
school autonomy and appreciation for market forces by the country’s unique experience and 
history of independent education. He argues that, ‘although only 7% of the population attend 
independent schools such as Eton, Westminster and St Paul’s, well over half of many professionals 
in positions of power have done so. 2009 data from the Panel on Fair Access to the Professions 
shows that 75% of judges, 70% of finance directors, 45% of top civil servants, and 32% of MPs 
[Members of Parliament] were independently schooled’. It is these professionals who are likely to 
decide on key educational policies while their successes reinforce the view that it’s this type of 
private education that will get you into the top jobs. A good education will provide you with the 
networks and social capital to do well in life and the value of education is particularly to improve 
one’s personal and national competitiveness in a global economy (Greany and Earley, 2016), rather 
than valuing education because it contributes to a robust democracy, offers the chance of personal 
fulfilment or the advancement of knowledge.  
 
Accountability often overrules coordination of quality and reform 
It is these differences in the social blueprint of a country, and how a country coordinates 
educational quality and improvement (Bronfenbrenner’s macro and exosystem) which structure 
and constrain the work of teachers and head teachers in the meso and the microsystem; in England 
the logic of the market and in the Netherlands the logic of network governance.  
 
However, it is not just the coordination upfront which regulates and shapes their work, but also, or 
perhaps even more so how they are held accountable for the quality and outcomes of their work. 
Here is where my work of the past years comes in and particularly one key lesson: ‘what gets 
measured, gets done’. Even if we are only measuring for reasons of transparency. This brings me 
to the second part of my talk in which I will explain how external accountability often overrules 
the policies and reforms implemented to coordinate school quality and improvement. One of the 
key studies in my career which exemplifies this was an EU-funded study of eight countries which 
showed us how the pressure to conform to inspection standards, and the perceived legitimacy of 
these standards to improve education creates a culture of constant monitoring and performativity 
where the inspection standards dominate the development of routines, structures, positions and 
tools in schools. Despite the logic of autonomy and free school choice in both England and the 
Netherlands, a focus on high student outcomes in academic subjects and approaches which are 
thought to be ‘inspection-approved’ prevailed. The perceived high pressure to confirm to 
inspection standards overruled the logic of the market and network where schools and teachers 
were expected to have professional discretion over their curriculum and develop an offer and 
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Table 1. Principals feeling pressure to do well on inspection standards in six European countries  
 
Country I feel pressure to do well on the inspection standards Mean SD 1  2 3 4 5 
ENG 1.7% 0.0% 3.0% 32.8% 62.8% 4.54 .717 
NL 2.2% 0.0% 8.9% 66.7% 22.2% 4.07 .720 
SE 2.5% 4.2% 15.5% 54.6% 23.1% 3.92 .882 
IE 4.1% 20.7% 18.2% 38.8% 18.2% 3.46 1.133 
CZ 8.9% 6.7% 35.6% 44.4% 4.4% 3.29 .991 
CH 14.5% 16.1% 25.8% 38.7% 4.8% 3.03 1.159 
AT 14.1% 22.1% 32.2% 27.4% 4.0% 2.85 1.097 
Total 6.4% 10.2% 18.6% 40.8% 23.9% 3.66 1.137
N=1169; n(IE)=121; n(ENG)=235; n(NL)=45; n(CZ)=45; n(AT)=298; n(SE)=355; n(CH)=62; 
chi2=479.468, df=24, p=.000 
1…strongly disagree, 2…disagree, 3…neither agree nor disagree, 4…agree, 5…strongly agree 
Source: Altrichter and Kemethofer, 2014 
 
In both England and the Netherlands (see figure 4), the high pressure of external inspections caused 
teachers to align the school’s curriculum, school organisation and teaching to inspection standards, 
to narrow the curriculum to what was tested (i.e. reading, writing and mathematics) and to coach 
their students to do well on the high stakes test. 
 




This process is exacerbated by the external environment of the school, such as publishers, 
homework institutes and various online platforms which offer and promote various resources of 
for example a ‘perfect Ofsted lesson. The example in figure 5, although from 2011, is illustrative 
in this context; it lists the six basic requirements every ‘outstanding Ofsted lesson’ should 
incorporate according to this source in the Times Education Supplement: a surprise, a purpose, an 
11 
 
investigative activity, differentiation, evaluation of the learning and a recording and reflection of 
the learning. This, and similar examples, have become so prominent in England that Ofsted, the 
English Inspectorate of Education initiated a ‘myth busting campaign’ to clarify the practices it 
requires and those it particularly does not.  
 





In both England and the Netherlands, the pressure to do well in inspections is thus not just coming 
from the inspection, but also from other actors in the system acting on inspection and test 
outcomes. Various qualitative studies (Perryman, 2006; Chapman, 2001; Lupton and Hempel-
Jorgensen, 2012) talk about how English schools in special measures struggle to recruit teachers 
and head teachers, how going into special measures is essentially a ‘career killer’ for a head teacher 
and how the naming and shaming from inspection judgements and league tables creates a culture 
of fear and pre-occupation to get a good or outstanding judgement. Having a banner of 
‘outstanding’ on the school gate matters to attract students and good teachers and English schools 
use these banners to brand their school. 
 
In our EU study we called this phenomenon ‘setting expectations’ and found that this was a key 
mechanism for change across the countries in our study.  The mechanism is well-known from neo-
institutional theories which explain how standards, such as those in inspection frameworks present 
and create socially acceptable definitions of quality and have for example created a shared view 
that reading, writing and arithmetic and mathematics are basic skills for everyone in Western 
societies and that these need to be taught in age-based classrooms in schools. Neo-institutional 
theory explains how accountability standards travel through the subsystems in Bronfenbrenner’s 
model and, when doing so, create homogeneity in structure and culture in schools.  
 
Accountability standards and coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism 
This brings me to the third part of my lecture, where I will focus on the mechanisms of change, 
and how and why accountability standards do, or do not improve education. Following the previous 
examples, I will explain how accountability standards inform a process whereby organisations tend 
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to become increasingly alike, even though we coordinate for variety, choice and freedom of 
education. 
 
This process is called ‘isomorphism’ and first posited by Weber, and later DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) who very aptly refer to an ‘iron cage’ and three mechanisms by which variety and diversity 
is ruled out: coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism. 
 
I already alluded to the first type of coercive isomorphism as described by Dimaggio and Powell 
when describing the pressure (both formal and informal) exerted on teachers and head teacher to 
confirm to inspection standards in a certain manner. Formal pressure would come from the 
sanctions imposed after a failing inspection, such as increased monitoring or a written notice to 
improve, while informal pressures are exerted by other organizations upon which schools are 
dependent and by the cultural expectations in the society within which schools function. Pressure 
may be felt as force or as persuasion, or what Dimaggio and Powell (1983) refer to as ‘as an 
invitation to join in collusion’; if your neighbouring school has an Ofsted banner on the school 
gate, you feel you need to have one as well, particularly when parents start asking for your 
inspection outcome. In a study with Marlies Honingh and Cor van Montfort we also found this 
effect in the Netherlands where schools talk about how their reputation in the local community is 
informed by their most recent inspection report.  
 
Inspections also have an important role in augmenting what Dimaggio and Powell refer to as 
mimetic processes: schools model themselves after other schools they perceive to be more 
legitimate or successful. They will for example copy behavioural policy, data systems or school 
self-evaluation protocols from schools that have received a good or outstanding inspection, 
legitimizing these practices as high quality. Schools will particularly mimic other schools when 
they are unsure about how to establish high achievement of their students (particularly of 
disadvantaged students) and when their search for potential effective practices leads them onto 
seemingly viable solutions that can be implemented with little expense. Inspections have an 
important role in augmenting such processes. Their publication of good practices, league tables of 
high performing and failing schools and benchmarking schools on common indicators of ‘good 
educational practices’ and outcomes allows schools to find such examples. The ‘Edubusiness’ or 
educational field of textbook developers, support organisations etcetera typically reinforces this 
process by selling and marketing products that are ‘inspection-approved’ and aligning their 
products and services to inspection frameworks, or by distributing the example I just showed of 
‘the perfect Ofsted lesson’.    
 
A third and final source of isomorphic change is normative pressure, according to Dimaggio and 
Powell (1983). Normative pressure stems primarily from professionalization where members of 
an occupation collectively define the conditions and methods of their work, how people enter the 
occupation (e.g. setting requirements on qualification for new entrants), and where they establish 
a cognitive base and legitimation for their occupational autonomy. Particularly the formal 
education of teachers, and the growth and elaboration of professional networks that span schools 
are important sources of isomorphism, such as when teacher training institutions convey clear 
norms about what good teaching or an effective school looks like and, in doing so, create a set of 
common expectations among teachers. The result is a teaching corps which tends to have a similar 
understanding of policies and practices that are legitimate, and view problems in a similar fashion. 
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Professional networks, such as those of the Dutch council for primary and secondary education, 
also allow new models and practices to diffuse rapidly, and to create a shared understanding of 
teachers and head teachers. These models of successful practices are often informed by inspection 
standards and frameworks and are diffused unintentionally and indirectly when teachers and head 
teachers move between schools.  
 
In England, normative pressures are explicitly organized by Ofsted in training head teachers on 
the inspection framework and including them in inspection teams of other peer schools. These 
head teachers learn about how to interpret inspection categories and the kind of practices an 
inspector would want to see and they take that knowledge back to their school. Over time the 
standards become the established way of how things are done and influence the type of 
improvement and effects generated, precluding future options for behavioural change, including 
those that would perhaps have been more effective in the long run. Wilkins (2011), Dougill et al 
(2011) and Berry (2012) explain how new young teachers in England will themselves have been 
educated in a system in which pupils were frequently tested and schools were required to meet 
externally- imposed standards and are regularly inspected. ‘It is all they have known so they don’t 
imagine it can be different’ (Berry, 2012, p.402). Teachers who express different views, for 
example of the importance of individual teacher autonomy, are now considered out of date or 
incompetent (Hall and Noyes, 2007). 
 
These established ideas of the way things are done can be very beneficial as they guide action and 
predict the behaviour of others. They create a sense of security and alignment in the system which 
for example eases the transition of students between schools and school phases and they allow 
teachers to take up a post in another school with relative ease. Such alignment and isomorphism 
from accountability standards is however not necessarily effective as I previously explained as 
standardization can lead to a narrow curriculum focused on tested subjects and can stifle 
innovation. This brings me to the last part of my lecture and a more forward-looking perspective 
of how we can come to what is often referred to as ‘intelligent accountability’ and the role of trust 
in reducing the unintended consequences from external accountability.  
 
Intelligent accountability and trust: three perspectives 
‘Intelligent accountability’ is not a new concept but has recently gained traction again with Onora 
O'Neill’s Reith lecture and ted talk in 2013. She and others (e.g. Crooks, 2003) describe intelligent 
accountability as a system which preserves and enhances trust among key participants. When we 
apply this to education, we expect trust to act as a lubricant in accountability relations, such as 
those between a head teacher and an inspector when discussing the quality of the school, or 
between a head teacher who performance manages his/her teacher. In such relations, trust would 
allow for more flexible monitoring and evaluation with open norms, instead of through very 
detailed indicators and protocols which tend to become very prescriptive. The argument goes 
something like this: … 
If, as a head teacher, I trust the Inspectorate of Education to be able to evaluate the quality of my 
school and to have the best interest of my staff and students at heart, I’m going to be fine with 
them using a set of heuristics in their inspection. If I however do not trust them, I will want to see 
exactly what criteria they will be using and how these are going to be used. A similar argument 




to become increasingly alike, even though we coordinate for variety, choice and freedom of 
education. 
 
This process is called ‘isomorphism’ and first posited by Weber, and later DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) who very aptly refer to an ‘iron cage’ and three mechanisms by which variety and diversity 
is ruled out: coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism. 
 
I already alluded to the first type of coercive isomorphism as described by Dimaggio and Powell 
when describing the pressure (both formal and informal) exerted on teachers and head teacher to 
confirm to inspection standards in a certain manner. Formal pressure would come from the 
sanctions imposed after a failing inspection, such as increased monitoring or a written notice to 
improve, while informal pressures are exerted by other organizations upon which schools are 
dependent and by the cultural expectations in the society within which schools function. Pressure 
may be felt as force or as persuasion, or what Dimaggio and Powell (1983) refer to as ‘as an 
invitation to join in collusion’; if your neighbouring school has an Ofsted banner on the school 
gate, you feel you need to have one as well, particularly when parents start asking for your 
inspection outcome. In a study with Marlies Honingh and Cor van Montfort we also found this 
effect in the Netherlands where schools talk about how their reputation in the local community is 
informed by their most recent inspection report.  
 
Inspections also have an important role in augmenting what Dimaggio and Powell refer to as 
mimetic processes: schools model themselves after other schools they perceive to be more 
legitimate or successful. They will for example copy behavioural policy, data systems or school 
self-evaluation protocols from schools that have received a good or outstanding inspection, 
legitimizing these practices as high quality. Schools will particularly mimic other schools when 
they are unsure about how to establish high achievement of their students (particularly of 
disadvantaged students) and when their search for potential effective practices leads them onto 
seemingly viable solutions that can be implemented with little expense. Inspections have an 
important role in augmenting such processes. Their publication of good practices, league tables of 
high performing and failing schools and benchmarking schools on common indicators of ‘good 
educational practices’ and outcomes allows schools to find such examples. The ‘Edubusiness’ or 
educational field of textbook developers, support organisations etcetera typically reinforces this 
process by selling and marketing products that are ‘inspection-approved’ and aligning their 
products and services to inspection frameworks, or by distributing the example I just showed of 
‘the perfect Ofsted lesson’.    
 
A third and final source of isomorphic change is normative pressure, according to Dimaggio and 
Powell (1983). Normative pressure stems primarily from professionalization where members of 
an occupation collectively define the conditions and methods of their work, how people enter the 
occupation (e.g. setting requirements on qualification for new entrants), and where they establish 
a cognitive base and legitimation for their occupational autonomy. Particularly the formal 
education of teachers, and the growth and elaboration of professional networks that span schools 
are important sources of isomorphism, such as when teacher training institutions convey clear 
norms about what good teaching or an effective school looks like and, in doing so, create a set of 
common expectations among teachers. The result is a teaching corps which tends to have a similar 
understanding of policies and practices that are legitimate, and view problems in a similar fashion. 
13 
 
Professional networks, such as those of the Dutch council for primary and secondary education, 
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This example indicates how a certain level of trust would, or can, inform various levels or forms 
of accountability. This is however only one perspective on the relationship between trust and 
accountability and one that has not been studied yet, particularly not in an education context. For 
further work in this area we therefore have to turn to the field of organisational management which 
offers a vast body of work on trust and control in cooperative exchange relationships. In this field, 
trust and control are viewed as two distinct modes to govern an exchange relationship, such as 
between a buyer and a supplier or an employer and employee, describing the combinations of trust 
and verification which enhance or detract exchange performance.  
 
In this field, trust is described as the expectation that an exchange partner will not behave 
opportunistically, even when such behaviour cannot be detected by the victim. An example of such 
opportunistic behaviour in a buyer-supplier relationship would be of a car dealer who would sell 
you a new car with second hand inferior parts where you wouldn’t be able to know that you are 
being conned (at least I wouldn’t know). In a school setting, examples of opportunistic behaviour 
are where teachers are paid to teach a certain number of hours by their school board or national 
government but show up late for work and their board or government is unable to know without 
some form of monitoring. They are taking a leap of faith when paying the teacher, assuming he or 
she can be trusted to do a good job. In a context where the ‘supplier’ or contracted partner cannot 
be trusted, control or monitoring is needed to ensure that he/she does not engage in opportunistic 
behaviour. However, when the contracted partner can be trusted, control and monitoring become 
redundant and induce costs on the transaction; someone has to pay for it. Also, the organisational 
management literature shows that introducing control and monitoring in a relationship where both 
actors are honest and committed to meeting agreements, the monitoring can actually reduce, or 
crowd out, trust (McEvily et al, 2003; Gundlach and Cannon, 2010). Future work on 
accountability, particularly in an education context which is far more complex than just the 
delivery of a positional good, needs to further explore the relation between trust and control and 
what ‘intelligent accountability’ entails and whether it is at all possible. Let me conclude by 
introducing the three perspectives offered by the field of organisational management and how we 
can use these to further the debate. 
 
The first complementary perspective positions trust and control as complements which can 
reinforce one another and lead to better, and a broader set of performance outcomes (Barrera et al, 
2015; Mills and Rubinstein Reiss, 2017; Näslund and Hallström, 2017). This perspective contends 
that governance of exchange relations may be crafted with multiple mechanisms that address 
different governance problems. In this perspective, the information gathered on someone’s 
performance may for example confirm initial (positive) assumptions of someone’s (perceived) 
trustworthiness and enhance the collaboration and trust between partners. Monitoring and control 
can also provide information that both partners can use to improve their exchange. 
 
In a school setting, a head teacher who performance manages his/her teachers would come to trust 
these teachers when these performance reviews confirm that teachers are doing a good job and are 
trying to teach well. Teachers would equally come to trust their head teacher when they feel they 
are treated fairly and just and understand the performance management to be implemented in an 
attempt to help them improve their work. In this case, the control and monitoring by the head 
teacher and teachers being accountable to their head teacher can promote trust and ensure that it 
becomes an established feature of the relationship. Formal control may thus promote trust when 
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those being regulated perceive the monitoring and sanction / reward process as a sign of good 
intentions and benevolence on the part of the regulator and when they interpret the monitoring as 
a signal of interest and credible concern. 
 
The second substitution perspective positions trust and control as two separate governance 
mechanisms: you either transact on the basis of trust, or on the basis of contractual agreements and 
verification. In this view, control mechanisms are viewed as redundant and inefficient when there 
is trust between partners. The higher transaction cost of control and monitoring are seen to lower 
performance, particularly when measured in terms of efficiency (Williamson 1991; Granovetter, 
1985). Trust reduces the need for effortful monitoring and frequent reanalysis of a situation or 
relationship as it enables people to make intuitive judgements and evaluations on the basis of one 
or a few simpler rules or cues (Lewicki and Brinsfield, 2015; Ostrom, 2010).  
 
The head teacher in our example would not need to performance manage his staff through a formal 
process of annual reviews if there is sufficient trust that would allow him to regularly observe 
his/her teachers, offer feedback on the quality of lessons and monitor in a more informal manner. 
More formal monitoring, in this perspective, would be viewed as unnecessary and costly when 
there is a setting of high trust and clear goal commitment. Colleagues Brown, O’Hara and 
McNamara’s findings in our second EU-study on inspections of educational networks has for 
example shown how high trust in the district inspector in West Belfast allowed him to join and 
contribute to working groups of schools and offer evaluative information and feedback on an 
ongoing basis.  
 
The use of monitoring and control can however also crowd out trust in the sense that the level of 
trust in the relationship is eroded when control and monitoring are introduced. Control is thought 
to reduce the level of trust in the relationship when partners in a relationship attribute the 
collaborative behaviour to the existence of control and monitoring, instead of innate behaviours 
and values on which trust would be based. In our example of performance management in a school, 
the head teacher would believe that teachers are only doing a good job because they are 
performance managed instead of out of intrinsic interest and concern for students’ learning and the 
quality of the school. The initial starting position matters here as control, when introduced into a 
distrustful relationship seems to escalate distrust, while the literature on external and internal 
motivation also indicates that external incentives to perform well may crowd out internal motives.  
 
Those who argue for this inverse perspective  (Gundlach and Cannon, 2010; Williamson; 1991) 
would state that control violates the underpinning principle of trust and that you cannot control 
someone you trust. These colleagues would argue that control stems from a position of distrust 
(Macaulay, 1963). If one is not trusted, one trusts less, leading to a lower level of trust in the 
relationship (Enzle & Anderson, 1993). In a study in South Africa with Andrew Paterson and 
Jacqueline Baxter we see clear examples of control and monitoring reducing trust, particularly 
when teachers and head teachers are held accountable to standards they can’t meet without 
additional capacity and support and where the understanding of ‘accountability’ in some schools 
also triggers an understanding of subjugation and compliance as that is how inspections were used 
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This particular example brings us back to Bronfenbrenner’s model and the social blueprint of a 
country and of the education system in which teachers and head teachers work. Their 
understanding of accountability pre-empts their engagement with, or passive or active resistance 
to external standards, and how the accountability system can or cannot operate to affect change. 
The example again explains that context is important, also in how trust and control will interact 
and which perspective we will find in any kind of system.   
The example also offers a somewhat sobering message in that there is no single type of ‘intelligent’ 
accountability system. Rather, intelligent accountability systems which improve the quality of 
teaching and learning vary according to context and the prevailing structure and culture of the 
system in which educators work and students learn. So we have come full circle and are back 
where we started the lecture: interactions between people matter, and moving to more ‘intelligent’ 
systems and accountability interventions requires an understanding of how this influences 




I look forward to furthering our knowledge in this area, and making it accessible to those who are 
trying to improve our education systems. Working with practitioners and academic colleagues is 
one of the great pleasures of this role and what I’m hoping to continue doing over the next years. 
I sincerely express my gratitude to the Executive Board of the university and to the Board of the 
Faculty, as well as the funders of my research for offering me the opportunity to do so. 
 
I’m particularly grateful to Professors Maartje Raijmakers and Monique Volman who alerted me 
to this position, to Professors Martijn Meeter, Carlo Schuengel, Lydia Krabbendam and Dr Nienke 
van Atteveldt and Rashmi Kusurkar for working with me in leading our research institute LEARN! 
and Professor Johannes Drerup, Dr Cor van Montfort and Anders Schinkel and our PhD students 
and post docs in furthering the work in educational governance, identity and diversity. The UCL 
Institute of Education and colleagues there are an important part of my career and it’s a great 
pleasure to be able to continue working with them in an honorary capacity. A special thank you to 
Dr. David Eddy-Spicer for his always thoughtful comments and edits of this talk, and to Professor 
Jaap Scheerens who has supported my academic career from the start.  
 
Tot slot een woord van dank aan mijn ouders; zij brachten mij de waarde van onderwijs al in een 
vroeg stadium bij. Dank jullie wel. Ruud, Suzanne en Rianne voor alle moral support door de jaren 
heen in de vele verhuizingen en veranderingen; jullie zijn de vaste rots waar ik op kan bouwen. 
En, last but definitely not least, Bas Leurs, mijn partner, mijn lief en grote inspiratie; we leap into 
the void.  
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